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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an economy having access to two di↵erent
energy sources. The first one is coming from natural polluting resources;
and second one is coming from a backstop natural resource. There are two
productive sectors in the economy. The first one is dedicated to manu-
facturing the backstop resources; the second one is devoted to production
of the consumption good. Both sectors are dirty in the sense that both
use the polluting resource at any time. The social planner, however, has
always the possibility of paying an irreversible fixed cost to switch the
consumption sector towards the use of a cleaner technology. Addition-
ally, we assume that the accumulation of the backstop, and the increase
in pollution stock are stochastic. Our results imply that the incentives
to switch to the cleaner technology depend on the relative importance of
fossil fuels in the production of consumption goods after the switch. We
also find that technological improvement in the solar panels sector is of
some importance in order to switch to cleaner technologies.
Keywords: Two sectors economy, Cleaner technologies, Switching, Uncer-
tainty, Irreversibility
1 Introduction
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC, 2007] and the Inter-
national Energy Agency [IEA, 2008] estimate that in order to limit the rise of
average global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius, the concentration of green-
house gases (GHG) should not exceed 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2. This
translates to a peak of global emissions in 2015 and at least a 50 per cent cut
in global emissions by 2050, compared with 2005 [UNEP, 2011]. This objective
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is consistent with that of many developed countries. For instance, France has
been committed in 2003 to divide by four the 1990 national level of GHG, while
the U.S. and Canada aim at reducing GHG emissions by more than 80 percent
by 2050.
To achieve this goal, one of the policies commonly undertaken by many coun-
tries is to substitute dirty energy sources, such as coal, oil and gas, with a cleaner
and renewable energy source, such as solar and wind energy. For instance, the
Directive 2009/28/EC on renewable energy, implemented by Member States by
December 2010, sets ambitious targets for all Member States, such that the
European Union will reach a 20 percent share of energy from renewable sources
by 2020. In spite of this, fossil fuels will continue to be an important part of the
energy mix around the world even by 2050. In particular, as long as renewable
energies are not very advanced and widespread, (i) industry will still need a
percentage of energy that derives from dirty resources, and (ii) the provision of
clean energy itself will require dirty resources at least as materials to build the
plants (think of solar panels for instance). This is the main idea that we address
here. We seek to account for the need of dirty resources even if a clean energy
can be used.
In this paper, we consider an economy having access to two di↵erent energy
sources. The first one comes from a natural polluting resource, such as fossil
fuels. The second one comes from a backstop natural resource, such as solar
radiation. In particular, we consider the case of solar radiation being converted
into energy by means of solar panels. There are two productive sectors in the
economy. The first one is dedicated to manufacturing the backstop resources.
At any time, this sector requires both fossil fuels and the energy provided by
the backstop already available. We therefore account for the need of fossil fuels
to provide clean energy. The second sector is devoted to production of the
consumption good. Initially it uses energy coming exclusively from fossil fuels.
However, it has always the possibility of switching towards a new technology
in which energy comes from both types of resources. As the backstop is being
accumulated such a switch becomes more attractive. In particular, it gets worth
paying a fixed cost to use the existing stock of new solar panels and avoid —
at least partially— the use of the polluting input. With this specification,
the economy becomes cleaner after the switch although not completely clean,
in the sense that the clean energy cannot fully replace fossil fuels to produce
the consumption good. Therefore we account for the fact that even if the new
technology is used, fossil fuels are still required in the industry. While taking into
account these two levels of dependence with respect to the fossil fuels (namely
(i) to run the economy, and (ii) to produce clean energy) after the switch, we
pay particular attention to the optimal timing of the switching decision, and on
the factors influencing the decision to switch.
In modelling this switching decision we include three important characteris-
tics that must be taken into account to evaluate the adoption of any environ-
mental policy [Pindyck, 2000, 2002]. First, we account for the uncertainty over
the future costs and benefits. In particular, we assume that the accumulation
of the backstop, and the increase in pollution stock —which in our case is equal
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to the resource extraction— are stochastic. Then, the future availability of the
backstop, and the future levels of pollution —a↵ecting the utility function—
are not completely known. Second, we introduce the irreversibilities associated
with environmental policy. Specifically, adoption of the cleaner technology im-
poses sunk cost on the consumption sector. Finally, we take into account the
fact that technology adoption is rarely a now or never proposition, such that,
in most cases, it is feasible to delay action and wait for new information. As
the adoption of the new technology is di cult to reverse, the sunk costs are in-
curred over a long period of time, even if the original rationale for the switching
disappears. These kind of sunk costs create an opportunity cost of adopting
the new technology now, rather than waiting for more information. Our results
imply that the incentives to switch to the cleaner technology depend on the
relative importance of fossil fuels in the production of consumption goods after
the switch. Specifically, if fossil fuels are relatively less important than solar
panels to produce consumption, the central planner tends to wait more in order
to switch to the new technology. This is because the solar panels sector needs
to be su ciently developed to prevent some consumption loss once the new
technology is adopted. But, if fossil fuels are relatively more important than
solar panels to produce consumption, switching to the new technology is easier
—smoother—, and then the incentives for the central planner to wait vanishes.
We also find that technological improvement in the solar panels sector is of some
importance in the decision to switch to cleaner technologies. If the technologi-
cal change implies that the backstop can be produced with relatively less of the
fossil fuels, the adoption occurs sooner .
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the assumptions
and equations governing our economy. In Section 3 we develop the general
equilibrium framework once the cleaner technology has been adopted by the
consumption sector. In section 4 we solve the model before the technological
switch by assuming that the discount rate is zero, and derive the socially optimal
adoption timing. We additionally perform a comparative statics exercise in
Section 5. In Section 6 we relax the assumption of a zero discount rate and then
solve the model by using numerical methods. We conclude in section 7.
2 The model
We consider an economy with access to two di↵erent energy sources: one dirty,
and another one clean. Dirty energy comes from a natural polluting resource,
Rt, such as fossil fuels (e.g. oil). Clean energy comes from a backstop natural
resource, such as solar radiation. Specifically, we consider the case of solar
radiation being converted into energy by means of solar panels, St.
There are two productive sectors in this economy. The first one is devoted to
production of the consumption good. Initially, it uses energy coming exclusively
from dirty inputs to run a given constant stock of capital K1. At some point,
however, the backstop becomes more developed in the economy, such that the
consumption sector is more interested to switch to a new technology using both
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types of energy, i.e. electricity from solar panels and oil, to run the capital.
Such a switch becomes more attractive as the backstop is being accumulated:
it gets worth paying a fixed cost to use the existing stock of solar panels. In
particular, we assume that:
Ct = B1(tRt)K1, (1)
for t < T , and:
Ct = A1(tRt)
⌘( tSt)
1 ⌘K1, (2)
for t   T , where T is the time of the switching, i.e. when the backstop becomes
more active —su ciently developed— in the economy. In equations (1) and (2),
B1, A1 > 0 are technological parameters, and ⌘ (0  ⌘  1) is the share of the
polluting resource in the consumption function. Notice that after the switch,
the smaller the parameter ⌘, the cleaner the consumption sector. However, even
in the limit case of ⌘ = 0, the economy is not completely “pollution-free” due
to the fact that solar panels still require fossil fuels to be produced by the other
sector (see below equations (3) and (4)).
The second sector is dedicated to manufacturing the backstop resource. This
sector requires both fossil fuels and the energy provided by the backstop already
available. On can think of solar panels whose fabrication requires some given
constant stock of capitalK2, as well as solar panels (for electricity provision) and
oil as a source of energy or of materials to be built. This particular assumption
is in line with a physician view of environmental economics that stresses the
need for oil in order to turn to a new energy (and some of them even doubting
that current reserves are su cient for this energy change). Moreover, e ciency
in this sector is stochastic, since there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding the
productivity of solar panels in energy provision and the maintenance costs of
these panels. Uncertainty is assumed to be multiplicative, meaning that the
larger the number of solar panels already built the larger future uncertainty
on solar panel accumulation. We assume that the backstop is accumulated
according to:
dSt = B2 [ (1  t)Rt + (1   )St]K2dt+  SK2StdzS , (3)
for t < T , and:
dSt = A2 [↵(1  t)Rt + (1  ↵)(1   t)St]K2dt+  SK2StdzS , (4)
for t   T , with St > 0, and S0 given. In equations (3), and (4) B2, A2 > 0 as
well as ↵ and   (0  ↵,   1) are technological parameters, and dzS is the stan-
dard increment of a Wiener process. The parameters t and  t (0  t, t  1)
are endogenously chosen fractions of the polluting and backstop resources, re-
spectively, used in the consumption sector. We assume that a 100 percent of
the extracted polluting resources, and a 100 percent of the backstop already
available are used in the economy. Hence, by choosing optimally t and  t, the
central planer is implicitly choosing (1   t) and (1    t) to be the fractions
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of the polluting and backstop resources, respectively, used in the backstop pro-
duction sector. It is worth noting that if t =  t = 1, there is no production
of solar panels after the switch —though they are still stochastically evolving
as a simple Brownian motion, then we go back to a one sector formulation. It
is also important to notice that before T the backstop resource is not used in
the consumption sector, though it is accumulated according to equation (3).
Additionally, uncertainty a↵ects solar panels accumulation in the same way ir-
respective of whether panels are used in the consumption sector or not.
Our formulation in equations (1) to (4) also implies that from period T the
economy becomes cleaner in the sense that the clean resource can be used to
provide the consumption good, but there is also a switch in technology since the
accumulation process of solar panels changes. Particularly, technology in solar
panel accumulation improves after the switch as long as A2 > B2. Additionally,
the green e↵ect of the switching is reinforced by assuming that ↵ <  , such
that the backstop production sector is less polluting-resource dependent after
the switch. We analyse this case, and the less general case in which there is no
technological improvement (A2 = B2 and ↵ =  ) in Section 5.
We assume that the increase in the pollution stock is equal to the resource
extraction. It is also subject to some multiplicative uncertainty that for instance
takes into account that Nature assimilation of CO2 released after oil combustion
is not well-known. This is described by the following equation:
dP = Rtdt+  PPtdzP , (5)
with Pt   0, and P0 given. dzP is another standard increment of a Wiener
process. For simplicity, we assume that dzS and dzP are uncorrelated.
The social preferences derived from consumption and environmental quality
can be represented by the lifetime expected utility:
E0
24 1Z
0
e ⇢⌧U(C⌧ , P⌧ )d⌧
35 = E0
24 1Z
0
e ⇢⌧
 
C⌧P ⌧
 1 "
1  " d⌧
35 , (6)
where   <  1, and ⇢   0 is the rate of time preference. This specification
satisfies some conditions that are now common in the literature, and takes
into account the fact that the combustion of fossil fuels is responsible for an
important part of CO2 emissions and other pollutants, and provides a (negative)
amenity to households. The cross derivative UcP is negative which means that
utility exhibits a “distaste e↵ect”, in the terminology of Michel and Rotillon
[1995]: a decrease in pollution increases the marginal utility of consumption
and implies that households have a higher desire to consume.
Since there are two arguments in the utility function, it is not immediately
obvious what risk aversion or intertemporal substitution means (see Debreu
[1976] and Kihlstrom and Mirman [1974] for the literature on multivariate risk
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aversion). Equation (6) can be rewritten as:
E0
26664
1Z
0
e ⇢⌧
✓
C
1
1+ 
⌧ P
 
1+ 
⌧
◆1  
1  " d⌧
37775
Debreu [1976] calls the function in the braces the “least concave utility func-
tion”. The exponents of this function may be interpreted as governing ordinal
preferences between the two goods in the absence of risk. The transforming
function [·]1   can then be interpreted as governing aversion to risk. A simple
calculation then reveals that the appropriate measure of risk relative aversion is
 . Then, following the terminology in Smith [1999] or Pommeret and Schubert
[2009] we will call   the e↵ective coe cient of relative risk aversion and E the
inverse of the e↵ective elasticity of intertemporal substitution Since   depends
on  , pollution changes risk aversion:
  = 1  (1  ")(1 +  )
E = 1  (1  ") = ".
From now on, we keep the notation " for the inverse of the e↵ective elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. We let ⌦ denote the set of admissible plans, that
is the set t,  t, extraction rates and dates of adoption (,  , R, T ), such that:
E0
24 1Z
0
e ⇢⌧ |U(C⌧ , P⌧ )| d⌧
35 <1.
In this case, we can write the value function of the central planner as:
V (S0, P0) = sup
(⌧ , ⌧ ,R⌧ ,T )2⌦
E0
8<:
TZ
0
e ⇢⌧
 
C⌧P ⌧
 1 "
1  " d⌧ + e
 ⇢TW (ST   IP  T , PT )
9=; ,
where W (·) is the value function after the switch and IP  t is the switching
cost. Notice that this cost is increasing with the level of pollution, and can be
expressed in terms of solar panels by means of some constant I > 0. In this
sense, the cost of switching to a new production technology in the consumption
sector is assimilated to a lost of some solar panels. This program can be solved in
two stages. We first solve for the problem for the representative agent assuming
that the backstop energy is used actively. We next determine the optimal time
for adopting the backstop in the consumption sector.
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3 The optimal path after the switch, and the
case without an option to switch
3.1 The after the switch case
We assume that the backstop energy is used actively in the economy. The set
of admissible plans collapses to the set (,  , R) such that:
Et
24 1Z
t
e ⇢(⌧ t) |U(C⌧ , P⌧ )| d⌧
35 <1.
The value function of the central planner is:
W (St, Pt) = sup
(⌧ , ⌧ ,R⌧ )2⌦
Et
8<:
1Z
t
e ⇢⌧
 
C⌧P ⌧
 1 "
1  " d⌧
9=; , t   T .
Then, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation can be written as:
⇢W (St, Pt) = max
t, t,Rt
8><>:
⇣
CtP
 
t
⌘1 "
1  " + Et [W (St+dt, Pt+dt)]
9>=>; , t   T . (7)
After maximizing the right hand side of equation (7), we can rewrite the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation by defining the following pollution-adjusted
version of the variables:
ct : = CtP
 
t (8)
st : = StP
 
t (9)
rt : = RtP
 
t . (10)
Then our problem is simplified to one of solving the following second order
di↵erential equation in one variable:
⇢! (st) = a1 [!
0 (st)]
" 1
" + a2!
0 (st) st + a3!00 (st) s2t ,
where:
a1 =
"
1  "

(1  ⌘)⇥A
A2(1  ↵)K2
  1 "
"
a2 = A2(1  ↵)K2 + 1
2
 (   1) 2P
a3 =
1
2
 
 2SK2 +  
2 2P
 
,
⇥A = A1
✓
1  ↵
↵
⌘
1  ⌘
◆⌘
K1,
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and:
W (St, Pt) ⌘ ! (st) .
This formulation leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If the clean energy is used actively in the consumption sector,
the value of the pollution-adjusted solar panels is:
!(st) = A
1
1  "s
1 "
t , (11)
where:
A =

1
a1
✓
⇢
1  "   a2 + "a3
◆  "
.
The optimal consumption, and the optimal amount of the dirty input used in
the consumption sector are:
c⇤t = ⇥A 
⇤st (12)
(trt)
⇤ =
1  ↵
↵
⌘
1  ⌘ 
⇤st, (13)
where:
 ⇤ =  ⇤t =

(1  ⌘)⇥1 "
A2(1  ↵)A
  1
"
is a constant.
Proof See A.
Therefore, we obtain that the repartition of the stock of solar panel between
the consumption sector and the backstop manufacturing sector is constant over
time. Notice that it is not necessarily the case for t that governs the repartition
of fossil fuel extraction between the two sectors. Moreover, (pollution-adjusted
or not) consumption is a constant fraction of (pollution-adjusted or not) solar
panels. The latter result follows from the fact that (trt)
⇤, i.e. the fossil fuel
input in the consumption good process, is a constant fraction of st.
In Proposition 1 we require that A > 0, so we impose:
⇢
1 "   a2 + "a3 > 0, if " < 1
⇢
1 "   a2 + "a3 < 0, if " > 1.
(14)
The transversality condition requires the convergence of the value function,
i.e.:
lim
t!1E0 [!(st)] = 0.
This condition is satisfied if !(st) does not grow too fast in expectation. This
requires that:
E [d!(st)] = !s(st)E (dst) +
1
2
!ss(st)E (dst)2 < 0.
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Hence:
( + 1)
⇢
1  ↵
↵
⌘
1  ⌘
✓
 ↵A2
 
◆
 ⇤
⇤
+
1
2
 2P [   " ( + 1)]
 
< 0. (15)
As  +1 < 0, guaranteeing condition (15) to be satisfied requires the term inside
the curly brackets to be strictly positive. We can show that su cient conditions
are:
  <
"
1  "
in the case of " > 1, and:
1  ↵
↵
⌘
1  ⌘
✓
 ↵A2
 
◆
 ⇤ >
    12 2P [   " ( + 1)]
    
otherwise.
3.2 The no option to switch case
Having solved the program once the clean energy has been adopted in the con-
sumption sector, one can easily deduce the solution of the central planner’s
problem in an economy in which this kind of energy is never available to this
sector. We will consider the fictive case in which —even though there is no pos-
sibility of switching— there is still a second sector which produces solar panels
according to equation (3). The hypothetical results —although not intuitively
relevant— will be theoretically useful for what follows. We let W0(St, Pt) be
the value function of the central planner of the economy with no clean energy
used in the consumption sector, with:
W0 (St, Pt) = sup
(⌧ ,R⌧ )2⌦
E0
8<:
1Z
t
e ⇢(⌧ t)
 
C⌧P ⌧
 1 "
1  " d⌧
9=;
Following the above steps and definitions, we can show that the value function
in this case can be written as:
⇢!0 (st) = b1 [!
0
0 (st)]
" 1
" + b2!
0
0 (st) st + b3!
00
0 (st) s
2
t ,
with:
b1 =
"
1  "

B1K1
 B2K2
  1 "
"
b2 ⌘ a2
b3 ⌘ a3.
and:
W0(St, Pt) ⌘ !0 (st) .
The solution is as in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 2 If the economy cannot use the clean energy in the consumption
sector, the value of the pollution-adjusted panels is:
!0(st) = B
1
1  "s
1 "
t , (16)
where:
B =

1
b1
✓
⇢
1  "   b2 + "b3
◆  "
.
The optimal consumption, and the optimal amount of the dirty input used in
the consumption sector are:
c⇤t = B1⇥Bst,
(rt)
⇤ = ⇥Bst,
where:
⇥B =
" 
B1K1
 1 "
B2 BK2
# 1
"
.
Proof See B.
In Proposition 2 we require that B > 0. We then impose:
⇢
1 "   b2 + "b3 > 0, if " < 1
⇢
1 "   b2 + "b3 < 0, if " > 1.
(17)
For any st the value function in equation (16) cannot be greater than the
lifetime utility of the agent in an economy with the clean energy available in the
consumption sector. Then, we must have:
!0(st)  !(st). (18)
This condition ensures that there exists an optimal switching date; that is,
in the absence of costs of switching to the cleaner energy, the central planner
would choose to immediately switch for any current level of pollution-adjusted
capital accumulation. A necessary and su cient condition for equation (18) to
be satisfied is:
A   B, if " < 1
A  B, if " > 1,
which we impose.
4 The optimal switching time, the undiscounted
case
The choice of an optimal consumption plan (through the choice of the optimal
extraction rate, and the variables t and  t) and of an optimal adoption time,
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is given by the maximization of the intertemporal utility function subject to the
laws of solar panels and pollution accumulations. Once the new energy has been
adopted, the central planner optimally follows the consumption plan described
by equation (12). Therefore, the value function at the time of the switch is
given by the following value-matching and smooth pasting conditions:
V (ST , PT ) = W (ST   IP  T , PT ), (19)
VS(ST , PT ) = WS(ST   IP  T , PT ), (20)
where V (ST , PT ) is the value function before the switch —evaluated at T , and
subscripts denote partial derivatives. The central planner’s problem becomes
then:
V (S0, P0) = sup
(⌧ , ⌧ ,R⌧ )2⌦
E0
8<:
TZ
0
e ⇢⌧
 
C⌧P ⌧
 1 "
1  " d⌧ + e
 ⇢TW (ST   IP  T , PT )
9=; ,
subject to equations (1), (4), (5), and conditions (19), and (20). Notice that the
value function before the switch depends on the current stock of solar panels
even though these panels are not used before T . This is because solar panels
have some value due to the existence of an opportunity to switch in the future.
By using the notation in equations (8) to (10), we can show that after maxi-
mization, the problem collapses to one of solving the following di↵erential equa-
tion:
⇢  (st) = b1 [ 
0 (st)]
" 1
" + b2 
0 (st) st + b3 00 (st) s2t , (21)
with:
V (St, Pt) ⌘   (st) ,
and the following boundary conditions:
 (sT ) = !(sT   I), (22)
 s(sT ) = !s(sT   I), (23)
which represent the pollution-adjusted version of the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions. In the problem above, sT is the level of the pollution-
adjusted solar panels stock for which it is optimal to switch. This value im-
plicitly determines the optimal switching time T . Additionally, given that the
central planner can always choose not to switch to the technology using panels
to produce consumption, another condition that must be satisfied is:
!0(st)   (st) 8t. (24)
The problem in equations (21) to (23) has an analytical solution only if the
discount rate ⇢ is equal to zero. Let us assume that it is the case. Then, we
can find an expression for the marginal value of the pollution-adjusted capital
before the switch:
 s(st) =
✓
D1
st
+D2s
D3
t
◆"
, (25)
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where:
D1 = B
1
" ,
D3 =   b2
"b3
,
and D2 is a constant that must be determined using the smooth pasting condi-
tion, equation (23). We can show that this is:
D2 =
1
sD3T
 
A
1
"
sT   I  
D1
sT
!
.
We define:
G(st, sT ) := D2s
D3
t
as the part of the value function due to the option to switch. Notice that in
the absence of such an option, i.e. G(st, sT ) ⌘ 0, the marginal value of the
pollution-adjusted capital reduces to !0s(st). We deduce from the following
Propositions that the value of G(st, sT ), and hence the value function and the
optimal switch time crucially depend on the value of ".
Proposition 3 If " < 1, then G(st, sT ) > 0, and  s(st) is always defined. As a
consequence the stock of the pollution-adjusted panels sT can be found by solving:
sTZ
0
 s(st)dt = !(sT ). (26)
Proof See C.
Equation (26) can be solved numerically. Numerical resolution is driven
using the parameters in Table 1. Figure 1 shows the three value functions:
before the switch,  (st), after the switch, !(st   I), and without the option to
switch, !0(st). The threshold that triggers the switch is sT = 0.4825.
Proposition 4 If " > 1 the option G(st, sT ) collapses to zero. In this case, the
value function before the switch can be found to be:
 (st) = B
1
1  "s
1 "
t +B0, (27)
for:
B0 =
1
1  "
h
A (sT   I)1 "  Bs1 "T
i
.
The optimal switching is then:
sT =
I
1 
⇣
b1
a1
⌘ 1
"
:= s⇤. (28)
The optimal consumption, and the optimal amount of the dirty input used in
the consumption sector remain as in Proposition (2).
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Table 1: Base Case Parameters, " < 1
   2.0
" 0.7
 S 0.5
 P 0.05
A1 1.0
A2 0.1
↵ 0.5
⌘ 0.5
B1 1.0
B2 0.1
  0.7
I 0.1
Proof See C.
As before, (pollution-adjusted or not) consumption is a constant fraction of
(pollution-adjusted or not) solar panels. This is because the fossil fuel input in
the consumption good process, (trt)
⇤, is still a constant fraction of st.
As an example, we drive a numerical resolution by using the values in Table
2. Figure 2 shows the three value functions: before the switch,  (st), after the
switch, !(st   I), and without the option to switch, !0(st). The threshold that
triggers the switch is sT = 0.2514.
Table 2: Base Case Parameters, " < 1
   2.0
" 1.7
 S 0.2
 P 0.2
A1 1.0
A2 0.6
↵ 0.5
⌘ 0.5
B1 1.0
B2 0.6
  0.7
I 0.1
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Figure 1: Optimal switching level of st, " < 1.
5 Comparative Statics
In this section we begin our analysis by considering the simplifying assumptions
of A2 = B2, and ↵ =  . In this case, there is no technological improvement in
the backstop production sector, nor a reinforcement of the “green e↵ect” after
the switch. By imposing these assumptions, the only advantage of the backstop
production sector when switching is that solar panels are to be shared with
the consumption sector. Next, we compare our results with those of the more
general case of A2 > B2, and ↵ <  .
5.1 No technological improvement in the solar panel pro-
cess
As a base case, we use the same parameters as in Table 1, and Table 2, in which
it is already assumed that A2 = B2, and we set ↵ =   = 0.85. Then we get that
sT = 1.4378 when " < 1 (Figure 3), and sT = 1.4451 when " > 1 (Figure 4).
We next consider the e↵ect of each of the parameters on the optimal switching
value of the pollution-adjusted panels.
We consider first the e↵ect of   on the level of the pollution-adjusted solar
panels stock triggering their adoption by the consumption sector. As we can de-
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Figure 2: Optimal switching level of st, " > 1.
duce from Table 3, sT is a decreasing (and convex) function of  : the larger (less
negative)  , the technology using solar panels is adopted by the consumption
sector for a smaller pollution-adjusted panels stock. This is a priori counter-
intuitive: more negative values of   means that the central planner cares more
about pollution a↵ecting the utility of households and adoption should occur for
a smaller solar panel stock. However, it has to be kept in mind that, from the
definition of sT , more negative values of  , and then smaller values of sT , may
perfectly correspond to higher levels of non-pollution-adjusted panels, ST , since
pollution may be smaller. Moreover, there exists another e↵ect of   through the
e↵ective risk aversion   = 1  (1  ")(1+ ) (see also equation (11) in which the
two e↵ects of this parameter clearly appear through the constants a2 and a3).
The larger  , the smaller the risk aversion. This may explain that a smaller ac-
cumulated stock of pollution-adjusted solar panels is required to switch. In the
case " > 1, the switch is triggered by the equality between the marginal values
before and after the switch that depend in the same way from  ; therefore this
parameter does not a↵ect sT . Again, it does not mean that it does not a↵ect
ST .
We now consider the e↵ect of ". As we know, this parameter is the inverse
of the e↵ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution. On the one hand, larger
values of " reduce the e↵ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution. On the
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Figure 3: Optimal switching level of st without technological change, " < 1.
other hand, larger values of " increase the e↵ective coe cient of risk aversion
  = 1   (1   ")(1 +  ). We deduce from Table 3 that the optimal level of
the pollution-adjusted solar panels is a decreasing function of ": less taste for
intertemporal substitution erodes the option value to wait and therefore induces
an adoption for a smaller stock of pollution adjusted panels.
Uncertainty plays an interesting role in the decision to switch, particularly
in the case of " < 1. The level of the pollution-adjusted solar panels at which
it is optimal to switch is a decreasing function of the uncertainty on the accu-
mulation of solar panels. This result on “economic” uncertainty fully reverses
that of the partial equilibrium literature (e.g. Pindyck [2000]), in which higher
levels of uncertainty increase the incentives to wait rather than adopt the policy
now. What happens here is that this uncertainty reduces the value before the
switch more than the value after it, therefore reducing the level of pollution
adjusted panels stock that triggers the switch. On the contrary, uncertainty on
pollution accumulation is consistent with the usual partial equilibrium e↵ect of
uncertainty. The e↵ect of both  S and  P disappears in the case of " > 1 be-
cause uncertainties a↵ect in the same way the marginal values before and after
the switch and therefore do not a↵ect sT (it does not mean that it does not
a↵ect ST ) as can be seen in equations (11) and (27). This is in standard result
in general equilibrium (see, for instance, Pommeret and Schubert [2009]).
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Figure 4: Optimal switching level of st without technological change, " < 1.
We also have that the level of the pollution-adjusted solar panels at which
it is optimal to switch is a decreasing function of the technological parameter
A1, and an increasing function of the technological parameter B1: the larger
the technology gain due to the switch, the smaller the pollution adjusted panels
stock that triggers adoption. Again this is due to an increase of the value after
the switch compared to that before the switch. On the other hand, sT is an
increasing function of A2: the more the level of technology in the solar panels
production sector, the later the adoption. As A2 = B2, the larger the level
of technology in this sector the less the incentives to switch. Such an e↵ect
necessarily arises from the e↵ect of solar panels technology on the option value
to switch. This last e↵ect, however, disappears in the case of " > 1 because
value functions before and after the switch are a↵ected in the same way.
Our simulations show that sT is an increasing (and convex) function of ⌘: as
the participation of the polluting resource in the production of the consumption
good after the switch increases the central planner will choose to adopt for a
larger sT ; the larger this parameter, the less the incentive to switch. On the
opposite, the larger ↵, the share of the polluting resource required to accumulate
solar panels (before and after the switch), the most important it is to use less
of the fossil fuel in the production of the consumption good and therefore the
smaller the sT that triggers the switch. Finally, the central planner will decide
17
to adopt for a higher sT if the irreversible investment cost is higher.
Table 3: Comparative statics without technological improvement
" < 1 " > 1
f 0(·) f 00(·) f 0(·) f 00(·)
   0   0 = 0 = 0
"  0   0  0   0
 S  0   0 = 0 = 0
 P   0   0 = 0 = 0
A1  0   0  0   0
A2   0   0 = 0 = 0
↵  0   0  0  0
⌘   0   0   0   0
B1   0   0   0  0
I   0 = 0   0 = 0
5.2 Technological improvement in the solar panels sector
We now relax the assumptions of ↵ =  . and A2 = B2, and see how much
the results change in the presence of technological improvement, i.e. ↵ <   and
A2 > B2, starting from the parameters of Table 1, and Table 2. Some e↵ects are
quite similar to those found in the previous section. For instance, the optimal
level of the pollution-adjusted solar panels is still a decreasing (but now convex)
function of ", a decreasing function of A1, and an increasing function of B1. We
also get that the central planner will decide to adopt for a higher sT the higher
the irreversible investment cost. However, most of the results are inverted. Let
us consider each of them.
As before, we first consider the e↵ect of   on the level of the pollution-
adjusted solar panels stock triggering their adoption by the consumption sector.
As we can see in Table 4, sT is an increasing function of  : the larger (less
negative)  , the higher the value of the adjusted-solar panels in order the tech-
nology using solar panels to be adopted by the consumption sector. This result
seems to be more intuitive than previously. In this particular case, i.e. if the
switch allows using less polluting resource for both consumption and solar pan-
els accumulation, it is the direct e↵ect of   on utility the one that matters the
most: more negative values of   mean that the central planer cares more about
pollution a↵ecting the utility of households and can increase the intertemporal
utility thanks to the technology improvement.
We now consider the e↵ect of uncertainty. The role played by uncertainty
on the accumulation of solar panels still depends on the value of " relative to
unity, and they are now reversed for " < 1. To explain these new results we can
focus on the e↵ect of the technological improvement after the switch. Whatever
the e↵ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the pollution-adjusted solar
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panels stock that triggers the switch is a decreasing function of the uncertainty
on pollution accumulation. This comes from the fact that the central planner
tries to mitigate the bad e↵ect of an increasing pollution uncertainty by adopting
the new technology sooner. Uncertainty on solar panels accumulations has a
di↵erent e↵ect. The role played by uncertainty on the accumulation of solar
panels depends again on the value of " relative to unity. In particular, for
" < 1, a larger  S now leads to a larger sT and such a result is consistent
with the existing literature on technology adoption under uncertainty in partial
equilibrium. But the e↵ect is reversed for " > 1. What happens is that more
uncertainty on solar panels accumulation unambiguously reduces the value after
the switch, but may increase the value before the switch through the option part
of the value. This should trigger adoption for a larger sT ; this is what occurs if
the agent likes to substitute in time, but it is no longer the case for " > 1 for
which there is no option part in marginal value before the switch.
Moreover, the level of the pollution-adjusted solar panels at which it is op-
timal to switch is a decreasing function of A2 and an increasing function of B2
whatever ": the more the gain in technology thanks to the switch the smaller the
adoption threshold sT . This results confirm that technological improvement in
either sector is an important incentive (absent in the previous section) to switch.
It is also clear that sT is an increasing function of ↵, and a decreasing function
of  . The more important is the polluting resource to produce solar panels
after the switch, the later the adoption. The more important is the polluting
resource to produce solar panels before the switch the sooner the adoption. Of
course, the fact that   is larger than ↵ and that A2 > B2 provide the cen-
tral planner with an additional incentive to switch, as solar panels production
process is more e cient after the switch and, in particular, it requires less of
the polluting resource in their production process. In other words, this sector
becomes “greener””.
Our simulations on ⌘ are as in Figure 5. Notice that sT is an increasing
(decreasing) function of ⌘ as long as ⌘  0.5 (⌘ > 0.5). This is the result of the
constant returns to scale in the production of the consumption good after the
switch. If fossil fuels are relatively less important than solar panels to produce
consumption, the central planner tends to wait for a larger value of sT in order
to switch to the new technology. This is because the solar panels sector needs to
be su ciently developed to not loosing consumption once the new technology
is adopted. But, if fossil fuels are relatively more important than solar panels
to produce consumption, switching to the new technology is easier (smoother),
and then the incentives to wait for the central planner start vanishing.
The e↵ect of all of the parameters on sT is summarized in Table 4.
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Figure 5: The e↵ect of ⌘ on the optimal switching level of st.
6 The optimal switching time, the discounted
case
When ⇢ 6= 0 there is no analytical solution to the problem described by equa-
tions (21) to (24). Hence, numerical methods are necessary to calculate the value
function in this case. As suggested by Judd [1992, 1998], we can use the approx-
imation properties of Chebyshev polynomials to compute stable non-diverging
solution of the Hamilton–Jacoby–Bellman equation (21). In this section, we
follow Mosin˜o (2012) in transforming the value function and the given condi-
tions into matrix equations with unknown Chebyshev coe cients. By using this
representation, our original problem of solving a partial di↵erential equation re-
duces to a problem of solving a simple system of algebraic equations. Interested
readers can also follow Dangl and Wirl [2004], which propose an algorithm using
Newton’s method.
6.1 A numerical approximation of the value function
In the computations that follow we suppress time subscripts as they are not
necessary for clarity. Suppose that b  (s) ⇡   (s) has a Chebyshev series solution
of the form:
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Table 4: Comparative statics with technological improvement
" < 1 " > 1
f 0(·) f 00(·) f 0(·) f 00(·)
    0 = 0   0  0
"  0  0  0  0
 S   0   0  0  0
 P  0  0  0  0
A1  0   0  0   0
A2  0   0  0   0
↵   0   0   0   0
⌘  0  0  0  0
B1   0   0   0   0
B2   0   0   0   0
   0   0  0   0
I   0 = 0   0 = 0
b  (s) = 1
2
 0T0(s) +
NX
i=1
 iTi(s), (29)
for s  s  sT . In equation (29), s is an artificial lower bound for s, and Ti(s),
i = 0, 1, . . . , N , is the general i-th Chebyshev polynomial of the first kind. This
can be obtained from the recurrence relation:
T0(h(s)) = 1,
T1(h(s)) = s, and
Tn+1(h(s)) = 2hTn(h(s))  Tn 1(h(s)),
where:
h(s) =
2s  (s+ sT )
sT   s . (30)
In equation (29),  i, i = 0, 1, . . . , N , are the Chebyshev coe cients to be deter-
mined, and N + 1 is the degree of approximation. We also assume that:
b (n) (s) = 1
2
 (n)0 T0(s) +
NX
i=1
 (n)i Ti(s), (31)
where b (n) (s) is the n-th derivative of b  (s) with respect to s, and  (n)i are also
Chebyshev coe cients. Obviously  (0)i =  i, and b (0) (s) = b  (s).
Equations (29) and (31) can also be expressed in matrix form:
b  (s) = T(s) , (32)b (n) (s) = 2nT(s)(Mg)n , (33)
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where:
T(s) = [T0(s) T1(s) · · · TN (s)] ,
  =

1
2
 0  1 · · ·  N
 0
,
and Mg is as defined in Mosin˜o (2012).
To obtain a Chebyshev solution of equation (21) in the form of (32), we first
linearise the non-linear equation (21):
⇢b k+1 (si) = b1 ⇣b (1)k (si)⌘  1" + b2si  b (1)k+1 (si) + b3b (2)k+1 (si) s2i , (34)
where k = 0, 1, 2, . . . refers to the k-th iteration on equation (34). Also:
si =
csT   s
2
(hi + 1) + s,
for csT being an initial guess of sT , and hi being the i-th collocation point defined
as:
hi = cos
✓
i⇡
N
◆
,
where i = 0, 1, . . . , N , and ⇡ is the standard mathematical constant. We also
write the “iterative” version of equation (22):
b k+1(csT ) = T(csT )  =!(csT   I). (35)
Notice that we are not taking the smooth pasting condition, equation (23), into
account. This condition will be useful only at the end of the process.1
To start iterating, we take the following initial guess:
b 0(s) = !(s  I), (36)
which satisfies equation (35) as long as s = csT . Inserting equation (36) into
equation (34) we get:
⇢b 1 (si) = b1 ⇣b (1)0 (si)⌘  1" + b2si  b (1)1 (si) + b3b (2)1 (si) s2i , (37)b 1(csT ) = !(csT   I). (38)
The linear di↵erential problem of equations (37) and (38) can be easily solved
by using the Chebyshev matrix method in Mosin˜o (2012). The resulting ap-
proximation b 1 is then used to solve:
⇢b 2 (si) = b1 ⇣b (1)2 (si)⌘  1" + b2si  b (1)2 (si) + b3b (2)2 (si) s2i ,b 2(csT ) = !(csT   I),
1Also notice that the transversality condition does not play an important role in the com-
putations. We can say that this condition is satisfied as long as the system is stable.
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and so on. In general, the result of the k-th iteration is used to activate the
(k + 1)-th iteration. If the process is convergent, a fixed point will be reached
after several iterations. The process is ended when the maximum absolute value
of the di↵erence between two consecutive estimates is less than a tolerance error
✏, i.e.: eEk+1 = max
sssT
|b k+1(csT )  b k(csT )|  ✏.
Finally, assume that b k+1 has reached a fixed point. Hence:
b k(csT ) = b (csT ).
The last step is to evaluate our resulting expression by using the smooth pasting
condition: b (1)(csT ) = !s(csT   I). (39)
If equation (39) is satisfied, we conclude that csT = sT is the optimal threshold
value. Otherwise, we have to guess another value for csT and start the whole
process again.2
6.2 Results
Table 5: Optimal switching time - Discounted Case
⇢ 0.005 0.01 0.015
" < 1 0.6570 0.9336 1.3263
" > 1 0.2530 0.2593 0.2656
In our computations we are using the base case parameters of Tables 1 and
2, and N = 15. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the particular example of ⇢ = 0.01 in
the more general case of technology improvement.
By running some simulations we can show that the qualitative results of
Section 5 remain the same. Then, we focus on the comparative statics with
respect to ⇢, whose results are shown in Table 5. As we can see, the level of the
pollution-adjusted solar panels at which it is optimal to switch is an increasing
function of ⇢: the higher the discount rate, the later the adoption. This result
fully reverses the results of previous literature (e.g. Hugonnier et al. [2008],
and Charlier et al. [2011]). Our intuition suggests that, as the social planner
is becoming more concerned about the present, she prefers waiting the solar
panels sector to be more developed before switching. This is because before any
action, the consumption sector can take advantage of the higher productivity of
the polluting resource.
2If csT = sT is not satisfied, we can find the optimal threshold value by using a simple
search algorithm.
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Figure 6: Optimal switching level of st, ⇢ 6= 0 " < 1.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we consider a model in which two sectors interact to produce
consumption. The first sector is dedicated to manufacturing a backstop resource
—solar panels for instance. At any time, this sector requires both fossil fuels
and the energy provided by the backstop already available. The second sector
is the one that produces the consumption good. Initially it uses energy coming
exclusively from fossil fuels. However, it has always the possibility of switching
to a new technology in which energy comes from both types of resources. Using
fossil fuels pollutes the economy. We assume that the accumulation of pollution,
as well as the accumulation of the backstop, are stochastic. We also assume that,
as this backstop resource is being accumulated, it gets worth paying a fixed and
irreversible cost to use the existing stock of new solar panels and avoid —at least
partially— the use of the polluting input. With this specification, the economy
becomes cleaner after the switch —although not completely clean. Particularly,
we account for the fact that even if the new technology is used, fossil fuels are
still required in the industry.
We find that the threshold triggering adoption crucially depends on tech-
nological parameters. In particular, the incentives to switch to the cleaner
technology depend on the relative importance of fossil fuels in the production
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Figure 7: Optimal switching level of st, ⇢ 6= 0 " < 1.
of consumption goods after the switch. Technological improvement in the solar
panels sector is also important in order to switch to cleaner technologies. If the
technological change implies that the backstop can be produced with relatively
less of the fossil fuels, the adoption occurs sooner. These conclusions are im-
portant in terms of economic policy. They imply that policy is to be focused on
(i) reducing the dependence of countries on fossil fuels — which is particularly
important for oil-dependent developing countries, and on (ii) innovation.
We also find that the e↵ect of uncertainty depends on the existence of tech-
nological improvement in the backstop production sector, and on the value of
inverse of the e↵ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution relative to unity.
If the inverse of the e↵ective intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than
unity, and in the absence of any technological improvement, the cleaner technol-
ogy is adopted sooner as the uncertainty on the accumulation of solar panels in-
creases. The cleaner technology is adopted later for higher levels of uncertainty
on pollution. The former result fully reverses that of the partial equilibrium
literature, while the latter is fully consistent with it. If the inverse of the e↵ec-
tive intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger than unity, however, both
uncertainties a↵ect the the marginal values before and after the switch in the
same way, and then their e↵ects disappear. This is a standard result in general
equilibrium settings.
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When there is technological improvement the e↵ect of uncertainty is even
more important. On the one hand, whatever the e↵ective intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution, the pollution-adjusted solar panels stock that triggers
the switch is a decreasing function of the uncertainty on pollution accumula-
tion. This comes from the fact that the central planner tries to mitigate the
bad e↵ect of an increasing pollution uncertainty by adopting the new technol-
ogy sooner. On the other hand, the uncertainty on solar panels accumulation
unambiguously reduces the value after the switch, but may increase the value
before the switch through the option part of the value.
An extension to this model seems to be particularly relevant. In this paper
we assume that the increase in the pollution stock is equal to the resource
extraction. However, exhaustibility of the resource is not taken into account
explicitly. To deal with this we can either (i) include another process for the
resource stock, or (ii) bound the pollution process to take into account the fact
that the resource stock cannot be negative. This issue is left for future work.
A Proof of Proposition 1
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation after the switch is as in equation (7):
⇢W (St, Pt) = max
t, t,Rt
8><>:
⇣
CtP
 
t
⌘1 "
1  " + Et [W (St+dt, Pt+dt)]
9>=>; (A.1)
Following the usual techniques (see Dixit and Pindyck [1994] for instance), and
using equations (2), (4), and (5) we can rewrite equation (A.1) as:
⇢W = max
, ,R
( 
CP 
 1 "
1  " +WSA2 [↵(1  )R+ (1  ↵)(1   )S]K2dt+WPR
)
+
1
2
h
WSS 
2
SK2
2
S2 +WPP 
2
PP
2
i
, (A.2)
where time subscripts and arguments have been suppressed for ease of exposi-
tion. Subscripts in equation (A.2) represent partial derivatives. The first order
conditions are: 
CP 
 1 " ⌘
R
+WSA2 [↵(1  )]K2 +WP = 0, (A.3) 
CP 
 1 " (1  ⌘)
 
+WSA2 [(1  ↵)S]K2 = 0, (A.4) 
CP 
 1 " ⌘

 WSA2 [↵R]K2 = 0. (A.5)
From equations (A.4) and (A.5) we get that:
R =
1  ↵
↵
⌘
1  ⌘ S. (A.6)
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Combining this result with equation (2) we obtain:
C = ⇥A S, (A.7)
where ⇥A is as defined in the main text. From this result and equation (A.4)
we also get:
 S =
"
(1  ⌘)  ⇥AP  1 "
WSA2(1  ↵)K2
# 1
"
. (A.8)
Using equations (A.7) and (A.8) — and after a few simplifications , we are
able to rewrite equation (A.2) as:
⇢W = a1
 
WsP
    " 1" +A2(1  ↵)K2WSS
+
1
2
h
WSS 
2
SK2
2
S2 +WPP 
2
PP
2
i
. (A.9)
We now consider the following transformation:
W (S, P ) ⌘ !(s); s := SP .
Then:
Ws = !sP
 ,
WP =
 
P
!ss,
and:
Wss = !ssP
2 ,
WPP =  
2!ss
S2
P 2
+  (   1)!s S
P 2
.
This last expressions allow us to rewrite equation (A.9) as in the main text:
⇢! = a1!
" 1
"
s + a2!sst + a3!sss
2
t . (A.10)
Solution to equation (A.10) can be easily find to be:
! = A
1
1  "s
1 ", (A.11)
which is equation (11) in the main text.
Finally, notice that equation (A.8) can be rewritten as:
 SP  =  s =

(1  ⌘)⇥1 "A
!SA2(1  ↵)K2
  1
"
.
By combining this equation with equation (A.11) we find that:
  =  ⇤ =

(1  ⌘)⇥1 "
A2(1  ↵)A
  1
"
is a constant. Direct application of this result on equations (A.6) and (A.7),
gives us equations (12) and (13) in the main text.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
We now use equations (1), (3), and (5) to write the Bellman equation before
the switch as:
⇢V = max
,R
( 
CP 
 1 "
1  " + VSB2 [ (1  )R+ (1   )S]K2dt+ VPR
)
+
1
2
h
VSS 
2
SK2
2
S2 + VPP 
2
PP
2
i
, (B.1)
where again time subscripts and arguments have been suppressed for ease of
exposition. Subscripts in equation (B.1) represent partial derivatives. The first
order conditions are: 
CP 
 1 " 1
R
+ VSB2 [ (1  )]K2 + VP = 0, (B.2) 
CP 
 1 " 1

  VSB2 [ R]K2 = 0. (B.3)
From equations (B.3) and (1) we get that:
R =
" 
B1K1P 
 1 "
VS B2K2
# 1
"
, (B.4)
and of course:
C = B1
" 
B1K1P 
 1 "
VS B2K2
# 1
"
K1. (B.5)
These results allow us to rewrite equation (B.1) as:
⇢V = b1
 
VsP
    " 1" +B2(1   )K2VSS
+
1
2
h
VSS 
2
SK2
2
S2 + VPP 
2
PP
2
i
. (B.6)
We now consider the following transformation:
V (S, P ) ⌘  (s); s := SP .
Then:
Vs =  sP
 ,
VP =
 
P
 ss,
and:
Vss =  ssP
2 ,
VPP =  
2 ss
S2
P 2
+  (   1) s S
P 2
.
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This last expressions allow us to rewrite equation (B.6) as in the main text:
⇢  = b1 
" 1
"
s + b2 sst + b3 sss
2
t . (B.7)
If an option to switch is not available, we redefine:
 (s) = !0(s),
and equation (B.7) can be solved directly. Solution can be easily found to be:
  = B
1
1  "s
1 ", (B.8)
which is equation (16) in the main text.
Finally, using equation (B.8) on equations (B.4) and (B.5) we get that:
c⇤t = B1⇥Bst,
(rt)
⇤ = ⇥Bst,
as in the main text.
C Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
The marginal value of the adjusted solar panels —equation (25) in the main
text— is:
 s(st) =
✓
D1
st
+G(st, sT )
◆"
. (C.1)
Equations (11) and (16), allow us to rewrite equation (C.1) as:
 s(st) =
 
[!00(st)]
1
" +
⇣
[!0(sT   I)]
1
"   [!00(sT )]
1
"
⌘✓ st
sT
◆D3!"
, (C.2)
where:
G(st, sT ) =
⇣
[!0(sT   I)]
1
"   [!00(sT )]
1
"
⌘✓ st
sT
◆D3
,
is the part of the value function due to the option to switch.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3
If " < 1, it can be easily deduced that:
!00(st)  !0(st) < !0(st   I).
This implies that G(st, sT ) > 0, and hence  s(st) (> 0) is always defined. Then
the stock of the pollution-adjusted solar panels can be found by integrating
equation (C.1) and using the value matching condition, equation (22) in the
main text.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 4
If " > 1, the sign of G(st, sT ) is ambiguous:
• Assume first that G(st, sT ) < 0. In this case, there is a value sinf :
sinf =
✓
D1
D2
◆ 1
D3 1
,
such that  s(st) < 0, and hence the program is not longer defined —
because a contradiction with the smooth pasting condition, equation (23)
in the main text. Then, this case cannot be considered.
• Now, assume that G(st, sT ) > 0. In this case the marginal value function
is positive as required. However, by integrating this we get that  (st) > 0,
which is a contradiction with the value matching condition —equation (22)
in the main text. Then this case cannot be considered either.
• G(st, sT ) = 0 ensures both that  (st) > 0 and that the value matching
condition can be satisfied. Then, this constitutes the sole case we can
consider. Equation (27) and s⇤ in the main text can be easily found by
integrating  s(st) and using the value matching condition, equation (22).
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